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Equity issues of the dual income tax have been left aside in the field of economics. Since a 
dual income tax needs different modelling than a comprehensive one this paper offers 
firstly a quantitative framework to measure redistributive effects; it turns out that this 
involves both direct and indirect effects. The effects of horizontal inequity and re-ranking 
are also incorporated into the decomposition analysis. The approach is applicable using 
available income and tax statistics. Secondly, partial effects of changes in tax parameters 
are presented; they are channelled through the direct and indirect effects; and are not 
always straightforward.  
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1. Introduction 
In  the  1980´s  and  1990´s  the  Nordic  countries  adopted  dual  income  tax  systems, 
which combine progressive taxation of labour income with proportional taxation of 
capital  income.  The  raison  d’être  for  this  innovation  was  concern  for  efficiency 
(Sørensen 1994, Nielsen and Sørensen 1997, Boadway 2005). Subsequent concerns 
have been for the amount of revenue raised, the distortion created, and aspects of 
equity and fairness. Concern for equity has gained much attention in the literature for 
a  comprehensive  income  tax,  both  theoretically  and  empirically  (see  for  example 
Lambert 2001, Wagstaff et. al. 1999), but there is no theoretical analysis that we 
know of in existing literature of the equity and/or inequality effects of a dual income 
tax system. 
In this paper, a quantitative framework is devised for analyzing the contributions of 
different parameters in a dual income tax system to the overall redistributive effect of 
the system. The problem comes, of course, in merging the (known) separate effects of 
the two taxes, on the distributions of labour and capital incomes respectively, into an 
overall effect on the joint distribution. By selecting the Gini coefficient as inequality 
measure,  we  are  able  to  combine  more-or-less  familiar  results  on  inequality 
decomposition across income sources (Shorrocks 1982, 1983), on redistributive effect 
(Kakwani 1977, Pfähler 1990) and on horizontal inequity and reranking (Aronson and 
Lambert 1994), to gain insight into the workings of a dual income tax system. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we briefly outline relevant 
results from the measurement literature in respect of a comprehensive income tax. 
Our new approach for decomposition of the redistributive effect of a dual income tax 
is presented in Section 3. In Section 4, a numerical example is given, to illustrate the 
workings of a dual income tax system and indicate the potential of the method in 
empirical  applications.  Section  5  investigates  how  changes  in  a  dual  income  tax 
system  may  affect  redistribution.  Section  6  concludes  with  an  evaluation  of  the 
contribution of the paper and discussion of ways forward. 
 
2.  Progressivity and redistributive effect for a comprehensive income tax: a brief 
review 
A comprehensive income tax is progressive if the average tax rate rises with income, 
proportional (flat) if average tax rate is constant and regressive if average tax rate 
decreases with income. Inequality is reduced by application of a progressive tax, stays 
the same after application of a flat tax, and is increased by application of a regressive 
tax  (Fellman  1976,  Jakobsson  1976).  Kakwani  (1977)  measures  progressivity  by 
twice the area between the Lorenz curve of pre-tax income, Lx, and the concentration 
curve of tax liabilities, Lt, formally: 
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where Ct is the concentration coefficient of tax liabilities and Gx is the Gini coefficient 
of pre-tax income. Redistributive effect is correspondingly measured by twice the 
area between the Lorenz curve of pre-tax income and the concentration curve of post-
tax (net) income: 3 
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where   
  is the concentration curve for post-tax income with respect to the pre-tax 
ranking of income units, and   
  is the concentration coefficient. Π   is known as the 
Reynolds-Smolensky index, after Reynolds and Smolensky (1977). Kakwani shows 
that: 
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where g is the fraction of all income taken in tax, or the ‘total tax ratio’. Equation (3) 
decomposes  redistributive  effect  multiplicatively  into  tax  level  and  progressivity 
contributions.  
Pfähler  (1990)  extends  this  methodology  to  determine  the  components  of 
progressivity and redistributive effect that are attributable to features of the tax code, 
namely, to allowances and deductions, and to the rate structure. Pfähler’s Kakwani 
measure  for  the  allowance,  viewed  as  a  subtraction  from  gross  income  in  the 
determination of taxable income, is: 
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where LA is the concentration curve and CA is the concentration coefficient for the 
allowance,
1 and his Reynolds-Smolensky index is: 
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where Lx-A is the concentration curve and Cx-A the concentration coefficient for income 
net of the allowance (taxable income in the absence of income-related deductions). 
Redistributive effect decomposes into level and progressivity components as: 
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where g is the average rate of allowance,           ⁄ .
2 Pfähler’s Kakwani and Reynold-
Smolensky indexes for the rate structure per se are these: 
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1 Allowances are generally lump sum amounts, hence      0 and Π 
    0. 
2 The same can be done for income-related tax deductions, if present. The equations are similar: see 
Pfähler (1990) for details.  4 
 
where y is taxable income, y   x – A in the absence of income-related deductions in 
the  tax  code,  Cy  is  the  concentration  curve  and  Ly  the  Lorenz  curve  for  taxable 
income. These values are also linked: 
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where gR is the total tax ratio of the rate structure, or             ⁄ . The bottom line is 
Pfähler’s decomposition: 
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Equation  (10)  decomposes  redistributive  effect  multiplicatively  into  components 
representing  the  features  of  the  tax  code  as  well  as  tax  level  and  progressivity 
contributions. 
The horizontal and reranking effects of a comprehensive income tax are dealt with in 
Aronson  and  Lambert  (1994),  who  offer  a  technique  to  measure  vertical 
redistribution, horizontal inequity and reranking effects commensurately using Gini-
based measures. These authors demonstrate that the Reynolds-Smolensky index for 
any tax can be decomposed, as: 
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where V measures the  redistribution that would have occurred if  equals had been 
treated  equally  (the  so-called  ‘vertical’  contribution  to  the  overall  redistributive 
effect), H measures horizontal inequity, as a loss of redistribution effect due to the 
unequal treatment of exact equals (i.e when individuals with the same gross income or 
pre-tax living standard do not pay same tax), and R measures the additional effect of 
reranking  (if  any)  caused  by  the  tax  system  since  post  tax  incomes  are  often 
differently ranked than pre tax incomes. 
 
3. Decomposing redistribution for a dual income tax: the new approach 
For a typical dual income tax, income from labour is taxed progressively and income 
from capital is taxed proportionally. The overall inequality effect of such a tax system 
can be positive or negative, depending on the component tax functions themselves 
and also upon the component income sub-distributions to which the taxes are applied, 
and  how  they  combine  into  the  joint  distribution.  To  see  that  inequality  may  be 
increased,  one  only  needs  to  consider  scenarios  where  there  is  complete  equality 
overall  before  tax,  but  people  have  different  combinations  of  labour  and  capital 
income: in such scenarios, except in very special circumstances, a dual income tax 
system inevitably introduces inequality where there was none.
3 To be quite general, 
we need to capture the  redistributive effects which are due to the composition of 
income as well as those stemming from the ceteris paribus actions of the component 
income tax functions on the relevant component distributions. 
                                                 
3 Let  tL(.) and tK(.) be the component tax functions The tax liability of a person having x in labour 
income and y in capital income, where x > y, would not be the same as the tax liability of a person 
having y in labour income and x in capital income unless tL(x) - tL(y) = tK(x) - tK(y). Therefore, given a 
dual income tax system {tL(.), tK(.)}, scenarios can be found in which overall inequality is increased 
(from zero) by application of the tax, unless the restriction  tL(x) - tL(y) = tK(x) - tK(y) holds for all x and 
all y > x, in which case the component  taxes must be proportional and have a common rate. 5 
 
The key is to decompose the Gini coefficient of gross income, Gx, and concentration 
coefficient of net income,   
 , into components expressing the characteristics of the 
source distributions, and then “rebuild” the overall measures from information (from 
Section 2 of this paper) about the component taxes. We therefore need a way to write 
a  Gini  or  concentration  coefficient  in  the  form  ∑        where  Sk  is  a  contribution 
coming  from  income  component  k  (and  k  =  2  here,  though  in  general  it  may  be 
larger).  That  is,  we  need  to  apply  a  decomposition  rule.  Shorrocks  (1982,  1983) 
debates several forms of decomposition rule, and not only for Gini and concentration 
coefficients. The perfect one for us is the so-called ‘natural rule’ in which          , 
where ak is the share of the kth income component in total income and Ck is the 
concentration  index  of  the  kth  income  component  with  respect  to  the  ranking  of 
income units by their overall incomes.
4 
Let αL and αK be the shares of labour and capital income in overall gross income, let 
gL and gK be the respective total tax ratios, or                  ⁄  and                    ⁄ , and g the 
overall total tax ratio,           ⁄ . Then the shares of labour and capital in overall net 
income are: 
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The natural decomposition rule tells us that 
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where CL and CK are the concentration indices of gross labour and capital income and 
  
  and   
  are the concentration indices of net labour and capital income. 
The overall Reynolds-Smolensky index, Π            
 , can now be written, using 
equations (14) and (15), as 
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or as 
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where  eL  and  eK  are  such  that    
             and    
             and,  of  course, 
          0. (17) can also be written as 
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equivalently, applying the Kakwani (1977) methodology, as  
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4 In particular, Shorrocks developed a decomposition rule, independent of the choice of inequality 
measure,  which  is  such  that  the  contribution  of  different  components  to  overall  inequality  is 
independent  of  the  index  chosen.  In  empirical  research,  some  scholars  have  chosen  to  use  this 
alternative decomposition rule (see e.g. Jäntti 1997, Jenkins 1995), while others  have  adopted the 
natural rule (see e.g. Brandolini and Smeeding 2009, Kakwani 1986, Pyatt et. al. 1980).  6 
 
in which      0      if            ,      0      if             and,          
0 if            .
5  
When        , the overall redistributive effect thus has indirect as well as direct 
effects, the indirect effects stemming purely from differences in tax levels. If  gL > gK, 
as typically, the indirect effects causes an increase in the contribution of the labour 
income tax to overall redistribution, but a decrease the contribution of the capital 
income tax. The net indirect effect is positive, and hence increases Π  , if     
  >
     
 .  Since          ,  the  condition  becomes    
  >   
 .  Normally  though,  the 
condition does not hold (Fräßdorf et. al. 2010, Jäntti 1997, Kakwani 1986). 
To summarize, equation (19) decomposes the Reynold-Smolensky index of overall 
redistributive effect into three components. First, the direct redistributive effect of 
(progressive) labour taxation on the labour income distribution; second, the same for 
the capital income tax; and third, the effect of the difference in tax levels (if any) 
between the income components, the indirect effect. This third term also depends on 
how the component income distributions ‘fit together’.
6 
If the component taxes within a dual income tax system do not themselves treat pre-
tax equals equally (although this would be unusual, given that the one is typically 
proportional and the other linear above a lump-sum allowance), then additional terms 
involving reranking and horizontal inequity could be incorporated into (18), along the 
lines of Aronson and Lambert (1994). Briefly, this involves an expansion in (19): 
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where HL and HK are the respective horizontal inequities for labour and capital income 
and RL and RK are the  reranking  effects.  Implementation of the method shown in 
equation (20) is not straightforward, involving the construction of pre-tax close equals 
groups with an optimal bandwidth, and details will be omitted here. See Urban and 
Lambert (2008) for a very full treatment and discussion.
7 
Finally, observing that it is usual for the component tax on capital incomes to be 
proportional, so that        
  and Π 
    0 in (19) and (20), and for the labour income 
tax to be linear above a lump-sum allowance (i.e. progressive), the Pfähler (1990) 
decomposition may now be applied. Setting aside the unequal treatment effects shown 
in (20), our simplified representation of (19) becomes: 
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5 From (12) and (13), we have          
    
       and          
    
     . 
6 A word of caution is in order. The terms in (19), and therefore those in (21), are not independent. For 
example, changes in the capital income distribution may affect the ordering of persons by their total 
incomes, and thereby affect   
  and   
  (etc.). 
7 See also Duclos and Araar (2006) where an alternative methodology using kernel density estimation 
is sketched, and also the free software for distributive analysis named DAD, which has been developed 
by these authors, is described and could be used to evaluate all components of our decompositions 7 
 
(19)-(21)  provide  a  convenient  and  succinct  quantitative  framework  to  analyze 
contributions to the overall redistributive effect of a dual income tax system.
8 
 
4. Numerical example 
In order to illustrate the decomposition formula represented in equation (21) here a 
numerical example is shown for a hypothetical distribution of income. Table 1 shows 
the income and taxation of 10 individuals. They have income from capital and labour. 
In the example, capital income is highly skewed towards the upper tail of the income 
distribution. Capital income is taxed proportionally, with a marginal and average tax 
rate of 10%. Labour income is taxed progressively with a 40% marginal tax rate on 
taxable income below 10 and 50% for taxable income above 10. The tax threshold, 
i.e. the allowance, is 7.5. Since, in this example, individuals below the tax threshold 
do not gain the entire allowance,      0.
9 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 2 shows redistribution for the hypothetical income distribution decomposed as 
in equation (21). Note that there is no horizontal inequity or reranking in this simple 
example.  The  table  therefore  shows  the  exact  decomposition  of  the  Reynold-
Smolensky index of redistribution and demonstrates that labour income tax decreases 
inequality while capital income tax has no effect on income inequality. 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
While the direct effects of the tax system reduce the Gini coefficient by 0,0302 points, 
the indirect effects increase it by 0,0170. The net effect is a decrease of the Gini by 
0,0132. The indirect effects of the tax system increase the Gini coefficient because 
capital income is taxed at a lower rate than labour income and is also concentrated at 
the top of the overall income distribution. 
 
5. Effects on overall redistribution of changes in the dual income tax 
Equation (21), or an appropriately expanded version of it (see footnote 8), can be used 
to determine the effects of changes in the dual income tax system on redistribution. 
The changes which we consider are threefold. First, we consider changes in the tax 
level (i.e. in one of gR, g  and gK). Second, we investigate a change in one of the 
progressivities Π 
  and Π 
 . Third, we show the effects of changes in the composition 
of gross income. The results to follow were inaccessible prior to the development of 
our methodology.  
The effect of an increase of the allowance can be found by differentiating equation 
(21) with respect to g, and observing that        ⁄           ⁄ : 
                                                 
8 Additional terms can be inserted into (21) if the labour income tax has income-related deductions 
and/or if the capital income tax is progressive. 
9 The tax system and distribution of income shown in table 1 have similarities with the Icelandic 
income distribution in the years before the financial crisis. Financial earnings in Iceland have, however, 
decreased substantially following the financial crisis in Iceland. 8 
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 ? 
This shows that an increase in the allowance has ambiguous effects on redistribution. 
The direct effects are ambiguous while the indirect effect enhances redistribution if 
the distribution of capital income is more unequal than of labour income. The result 
that  increase  in  the  tax  allowance  has  ambiguous  effects  on  P
RS  is  in  line  with 
Lambert (1985). Lambert showed that increasing the allowance beyond a certain point 
would become counterproductive for raising P
RS.
10 The indirect effects do though 
increase the likelihood of an increase in the allowance to increase P
RS. 
The effect of an increase in the level of capital income taxation is given by: 
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> 0 
If the taxation of capital income is proportional, an increase in its rate has no direct 
effects  on  the  level  of  redistribution.  The  net  indirect  effect  is  positive  if  capital 
income is more unequally distributed than labour income (as is typical): decreasing 
the  after  tax  share  of  capital  income  enhances  the  redistribution  P
RS  of  the  dual 
income tax system. 
The effect of an increase in the rate of the labour income tax, without altering its 
distribution, is given by: 
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whose sign is ambiguous if capital income is distributed more unequally than labour 
income.  
The effect of increasing the progressivity of the rate structure can also be found by 
differentiating in (21):  
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10 Lambert´s results are based on a linear income tax, the result should though hold for a tax system 
with a progressive marginal rate structure. 9 
 
Redistributive effect is enhanced through both direct and indirect effects. Exactly the 
same holds for the effect of an increase in the progressivity of the capital income tax 
(obtained by differentiating an expanded version of (21), in which Π 
  appears, and 
then setting Π 
    0). Introducing progression into the capital income tax component 
of  the  dual  system  would  increase  redistribution  through  both  direct  and  indirect 
effects. 
Finally, we consider the effect of an increase in the share αK of capital income in 
gross income, by differentiating in the expanded version of (18) and again setting 
Π 
    0: 
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If the share of capital income increases, all else equal,
11 the redistributive effect of the 
tax system will diminish. The opposite is true for labour income: overall redistributive 
effect increases if aL increases. 
 
6. Discussion 
A dual income tax system typically combines progressive taxation on labour (and 
transfer)  income  with  a  proportional  tax  on  capital  income.  Theoretically,  the 
adoption  of  such  an  income  tax  system  has  mostly  been  argued  using  efficiency 
reasoning,  while  distributive  reasoning  has  been  left  aside.  New  methodology  is 
required to assess redistributive effects in a dual income system. We have presented a 
new approach here, involving both direct and indirect effects on overall redistribution, 
which is applicable using available income and tax statistics. The effects of horizontal 
inequities and reranking can also be accommodated in the new approach. Implications 
and outcomes have been illustrated using a hypothetical income distribution, where 
capital income was very unequally distributed. We also investigated partial effects of 
changes in individual tax parameters on overall redistribution, which are not always 
straightforward. 
Our approach depends specifically on the choice of the Gini coefficient as inequality 
measure, and on the choice of a particular decomposition rule, the so-called ‘natural’ 
one, for the overall Gini coefficient across income sources. One could of course use 
other decomposition rules, albeit with a significant loss of tractability; and/or design 
equivalent methodology using the Atkinson index or extended Gini coefficient (for 
example) to measure inequality. 
It is plain that much work remains to be done, both theoretical and empirical, on the 
redistributional effects of a dual income tax. This paper presented a methodology for 
measurement  purposes.  Other  issues,  for  example  concerning  changes  in  market 
incomes, need also to be explored. No empirical study has to our knowledge yet been 
done trying to assess the distributional effects of a dual income tax. 
                                                 
11 Note however that CK and CL may also change if αL and αL change, as the ordering of persons by 
their  overall  gross  income  may  vary.  This  possibly  second-order  effect  (if  αL  and  αL  change  by 
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Table 1: A hypothetical income distribution. 
  x  xK  xL  t  tK  tL  A  y = x-A  x-t 
1  7  0  7  0.0  0.0  0.0  7.0  0.0  7.0 
2  9  0  9  0.6  0.0  0.6  7.5  1.5  8.4 
3  9  0  9  0.6  0.0  0.6  7.5  1.5  8.4 
4  10  0  10  1.0  0.0  1.0  7.5  2.5  9.0 
5  15  1  14  2.7  0.1  2.6  7.5  6.5  12.3 
6  18  2  16  3.6  0.2  3.4  7.5  8.5  14.4 
7  20  3  17  4.1  0.3  3.8  7.5  9.5  15.9 
8  25  4  21  6.2  0.4  5.8  7.5  13.5  18.9 
9  30  5  25  8.3  0.5  7.8  7.5  17.5  21.8 
10  60  54  6  5.4  5.4  0.0  6.0  0.0  54.6 
Sum  203  69  134  32.4  6.9  26.0  73  61  171 
Gini / concentration  0.363  0.799  0.139  0.432  0.799  0.333  -0.012  0.320  0.350 
Table 2: Redistribution decomposed for the hypothetical distribution. 
Direct effects    0.0302 
  Labour income taxation    Π 
       0.0302   
    Rate structure    
  
    Π 
      0,0021     
      Progressivity  Π 
    0.0137       
      Average tax rate  
  
       0.2350       
      Labour income share (aL)  0.6601       
    Allowance    
  
    
 
 
   Π 
    0.0281     
      Progressivity  Π 
    -0.1511       
      Average tax rate  
  
    
 
 
      0.2813       
      Labour income share (aL)  0.6601       
  Capital income taxation     Π 
         0.0000   
      Progressivity  Π 
    0.0000       
      Average tax rate  
  
       0.1111       
      Capital income share (aK)  0.3399       
Indirect effects        -0.0170 
  From labour income      
    -0.0022       
  From capital income      
    0.0193       
Redistribution  Π           0.0132 
 